In a crisis, do employers place the burden of adjustment disproportionately on female employees? Relying on household and labor force data, existing studies of the distributional impact of crises have not been able to address this question. Indonesia's census of manufacturing firms allows us to analyze employer responses and to identify mechanisms by which gender differences in impact may arise, notably differential treatment of men and women within firms as well as gender sorting across firms that varied in their exposure to the crisis. On average, women indeed faced significantly higher employment and wage cuts than their male colleagues within the same firm. However, the aggregate adverse effect of such differential treatment was more than offset by women being disproportionately employed in firms hit relatively less hard by the crisis. Analyzing how employer characteristics impact labor market adjustment patterns contributes to our understanding of who is vulnerable in volatile times.
Introduction
Using firm level data, this paper brings a new perspective to the question of who is vulnerable in volatile times. By focusing on gender differences in labor market impacts of crises, it illustrates how firm level data can benefit our understanding of who is at risk of losing their job and why. Existing studies that examine the distributional impact of crises almost exclusively rely on labor force and household level data, and consequently focus on labor supply. However, crisis induced changes in labor market outcomes are predominantly driven by changes in labor demand; labor supply responses are typically muted compared to the large contractions in labor demand that are a defining feature of crises (Thomas et al, 2002 , McKenzie, 2004 . In addition, micro-level studies of the distributional consequences of crises typically document significant heterogeneity in impact across broad sectors, yet fail to explore how such heterogeneity arises (see e.g. Fallon and Lucas, 2002) . Moreover, they are not able to distinguish between different mechanisms that might explain why some workers are more vulnerable than others. This paper helps redress these lacunae in the literature by examining how variations in firm responses during the East Asian crisis in Indonesia affected men's and women's relative employment vulnerability. It distinguishes between two previously unexplored mechanisms by which gender difference in impact might arise: (i) differences in vulnerability could be the result of sorting by gender into firms and occupations that differ in their vulnerability to crises, and/or (ii) because of differential treatment of men and women workers within firms.
That employers often treat men and women differently in the workplace is widely documented (see Altonji and Blank, 1999 for a review of the literature), and there is no shortage of rhetoric asserting that women are disproportionately at risk during volatile times (Grown, 2009; ILO, 2009; World Bank, 2009) .
1 A common concern is that women get dismissed first and hired last (Oxfam, 2009 , Seguino, 2009 and UNGEI, 2009 ). However, the limited empirical evidence on the labor market consequences of macroeconomic crisis is distinctly ambiguous as to whether women or men were more vulnerable (Houseman and Abraham, 1993 , Lim 2000 , Thomas et al., 2002 , begging the question as to whether claims regarding women's vulnerability may be exaggerated.
Moreover, many of the assertions about women's relative vulnerability are predicated on the idea that employers discriminate against women. While we cannot prove or disprove the existence of employer discrimination, distinguishing between sorting and differential treatment helps assess the likely magnitude of employer discrimination. In the sorting channel, the role of gender is indirect. It could influence how men and women select into different firms, but is unlikely to explain the variation in the impact of the crisis across sectors, firms and occupations. Thus, if differences in impact are driven by heterogeneity in impact of the crisis across firms that differ in the gender composition of their workforce (sorting), then the likely role of discrimination is limited. By contrast, differential treatment is more direct; at issue is whether, confronted with a need to adjust, firms fired women first or cut their wages more. Concerns of discrimination are more pertinent if gender differences in impact are predominantly due to differential treatment.
2
Distinguishing between sorting and differential treatment is particularly important since the effects of these mechanisms could offset each other, resulting in an underestimation of gender differences in impact in aggregate statistics. This could happen, for example, if women were working in large firms that were more resilient to the crisis, yet such firms were more likely to fire women.
Indeed, this paper will demonstrate that when favorable sorting effects dominate, aggregate statistics can obscure unfavorable differential treatment.
Sorting and differential treatment are not only relevant for examining employment, they could also explain gender differences in wage adjustment. Sorting across firms and by occupation could affect whether women tend to face wage or labor adjustment. The extent to which an employer will respond by cutting wages rather than jobs is likely to be affected by the employer's characteristics, e.g. large firms and foreign owned firms tend to pay higher wages and thus have greater flexibility to adjust wages than small firms already paying at (or below) minimum wages.
There may also be differential treatment in wage adjustment within firms. If women are willing to accept greater wage cuts than men, there could also be a gender specific wage-employment tradeoff that may render their employment less vulnerable than men's. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to examine the wage-employment trade-off at times of crises and the only paper thus far to consider gender-differences in this trade-off.
The '97-'98 crisis in Indonesia provides a very relevant context to explore these issues. As in many other countries, gender norms in Indonesia prioritize men's employment over women's 2 Differential treatment need not necessarily reflect discrimination per se since we cannot control fully for workers' individual characteristics. Conversely, in the presence of unobserved worker heterogeneity, it could be possible, although it is highly unlikely, to have discrimination in the absence of observed differential treatment. In this paper, we control for time-invariant heterogeneity, which should capture the lion's share of unobserved differences between men and women. Moreover, we control for differences due to occupation and a wide range of firm characteristics. (World Value Surveys, 1981 ). Moreover, identification of firm responses is facilitated by the unexpected nature of the crisis and its severity, the high flexibility of Indonesian labor markets at the inception of the crisis, and the richness of the Indonesian manufacturing census dataset that not only provides detailed information on employer characteristics, but also gender disaggregated employment information by occupation.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the related literature and provides background information on the Indonesian crisis. The data are discussed in section three, which also provides a static overview of sorting patterns by gender. Section four presents a bird's eye view of employment and wage adjustment during the crisis. Sorting effects are assessed by examining whether firms that employed proportionately more women were more likely to exit (section 5) and by assessing how, among continuing firms, employment growth was correlated with the initial gender composition of the workforce (section 6). Next, section seven examines the evidence for differential treatment by assessing whether women were proportionately more likely to be fired than men in firms that adjusted the size of their workforce. It is not only of interest to know whether men and women were treated differently at the firm-level, but also to know whether the crisis led to a change in discriminatory practices/differential treatment of men and women within firms. 3 We therefore test how employment adjustment and wage setting during the crisis differed from non-crisis periods. Section eight examines the evolution of the gender wage differences to assess whether women suffered more severe wage cuts than men, and the extent to which there is gender-specificity in employment-wage tradeoffs. Conclusions are presented in section nine.
The appendix validates our firm-level analysis with an analysis of the evolution of wages and employment using data on manufacturing employees from SAKERNAS, a nationally representative labor force survey in Indonesia. We cannot tell from this labor force survey the characteristics of the employer, but the labor force data enable us to control for individual characteristics and the comparison with the firm-level data highlights the extent to which the patterns for the larger formal manufacturing sector were mirrored in the broader population of manufacturing workers.
Our main results can be summarized as follows: Gender differences arose both because of sorting and differential treatment and these often worked in opposite directions. Overall, sorting dominated -and was favorable to women's employment. Even though 45% of all manufacturing jobs were held by women, women's net job losses accounted for only a third of all the jobs lost during the crisis. However, we also find heterogeneity across occupations and types of firms. Bluecollar women suffered from unfavorable differential treatment in hiring and firing in small firms. By contrast, white collar women were more likely to retain their jobs than their male counterparts in such firms. Gender difference in wage adjustment are driven both by sorting and differential treatment in ways that reinforced each other, as large firms appear to have cut women's wages more.
These patterns are mirrored in the labor force data analyzed in the appendix.
Previous Literature and Context

Related Literature
This study brings together and builds on two strands of literature that have evolved quite separately up until this point. While a large body of literature has examined gender differences in the labor market outcomes of crises and shocks, focusing especially on the supply side by concentrating on households and individuals, 4 few such studies have focused on the role of employers. Conversely, the relatively small literature on firms' adjustment during crises has not explored whether firms' responses result in gender differences in wage and employment outcomes.
The literature on differences in men's and women's employment outcomes due to macroeconomic shocks has typically focused on changes brought on by either large-scale structural policy regime shifts (i.e., trade, privatization or financial liberalization) or by macroeconomic crises.
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Starting with the former, trade policy has been shown to have a substantial gender impact because of 4 A broader literature has explored the question of whether women bear the brunt of coping with economic shocks (see inter alia, Sen and Grown, 1987) and has yielded conflicting results; in some instances women and girls suffer more severe welfare effects than men and boys in terms of health and nutrition (see, for example, Behrman, 1998; and Dercon and Krishnan, 2002) ; in other instances, there are no gender differences in health and education outcomes (Levine and Ames, 2003) or in household income (Cunningham and Maloney, 2000) ; occasionally, men suffer more than women. For example, male headed households suffered larger income losses due to macroeconomic shocks in Peru 1980s (Glewwe and Hall; 1998) . 5 By examining how gender equity is affected by an economic crisis the paper also contributes to the growing literature on the link between gender equity and economic development (see e.g., Mammen and Paxson, 2000) . While this literature has focused extensively on the link between growth and gender equity (see e.g., Klasen and Lamanna, 1998) , it is not known whether gains in gender equity are wiped out during a crisis. For example, it is not known whether crises inflate or reduce preexistent gender pay differences.
sorting by gender into exporting and non-exporting firms (Wood, 1991; Fontana and Wood, 2000; Ozler, 2000) . 6 Rama (2002) considers the impact on women's employment and wages of a downsizing of state-owned enterprises in Vietnam using simulations based on the Vietnam Living Standards Survey and finds evidence for initial shedding of female workers (relative to men), but a reduction in gender pay gaps. Secondly, studies on gender differences resulting from macroeconomic crises have yielded conflicting conclusions about the responses of female workers relative to those of male workers (see e.g. Thomas et al., 2002) .
Macroeconomic shocks have profound impacts on job flows and wages. Studies of manufacturing firms suggest that economic downturns associated with the business cycle are typically associated with excess churning of firms and workers (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992; Davis et al., 1996) . Gallego and Tessada (2009) use sectoral panel data on job flows to examine the employment impact of sudden stops in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico and find that crises are associated with lower job creation and increased job destruction and that these effects are heterogeneous across sectors and countries.
However, very few studies examine heterogeneity in impact by gender. We are aware of only two papers that look at gender differences in job creation and destruction focusing on firm-level employment dynamics. Houseman and Abraham (1993) examine differences in employment responses of men and women to changes in output in U.S. and Japanese manufacturing from . Although their study does not explicitly focus on employment adjustment in response to financial crises, their findings suggest that, relative to men, women bore a disproportionate amount of the burden of the labor adjustment to the oil crises of the 70s. The second is Lim (2000) , who examines employment patterns in the Philippines during the East Asian crisis and finds that male employment, having increased relatively faster in the lead up to the crisis then fell relatively more during the crisis. Yet these studies neither focus on both wage and employment adjustment nor distinguish between differential treatment and sorting.
A handful of studies have examined firm level employment and wage adjustment in the context of transition from state-controlled towards market-oriented economies (see Christev and Fitzroy, 2002 , Basu et al. 1997 , Haltiwanger and Vodopivec, 2003 and in the context of trade liberalization (Revenga, 1997) . However, the analyses are not disaggregated by gender and do not encompass a crisis period.
Context: the Indonesian Crisis
In the early 1990s Indonesia was at the height of an extended period of industrialization with manufacturing being an important engine of growth. (Dwor-Frecault et al. 1999 ). In the wake of the devaluation of the Thai Baht in July 1997, flows of foreign capital reversed drastically and the rupiah depreciated dramatically. Interest rates were raised to defend the currency, which exacerbated the decline in demand. Inflation rates, which had been 12%, shot up to close to 100% (Hill, 1999) . GDP contracted severely in 1997, and fell by over 13% in 1998. Manufacturing output followed a similar pattern, though manufacturing growth had already suffered a mild dip in 1996. The drop in manufacturing output was large relative to the corresponding dip in GDP. Manufacturing, a sector with 45 percent women employees, was one of the hardest hit sectors, making it an interesting case study to examine how employer responses to shocks affected men and women differently.
Estimates based on SAKERNAS indicate the spike in inflation facilitated real wage adjustment by reducing the relevance of nominal wage rigidities and minimum wages. Across the earnings distribution, both men and women experienced real wage cuts on the order of 40%. Yet the changes in total employment rates were relatively small: between 1997 and 1998, female employment in urban areas declined by 0.7% and male employment declined by 2.2% (Thomas et al. 2002) . Labor force participation rates increased slightly more for women (1.5%) than men (1.4%) (see also Cameron, 2000) . 7 Thus, the impact of the crisis on aggregate employment was muted (Fallon and Lucas, 2002) . 8 Thomas et al. (2002) conclude that -the evidence suggests that short-run labor supply functions are fairly inelastic in Indonesia‖ (p. 177). If true, then a reduced form approach to modeling relative employment changes will predominantly be identifying demand rather than supply effects.
Data and descriptive statistics
Data and construction of key explanatory variables
7 By contrast, estimates based on the Indonesian Family Life Survey, a rotating panel of households, suggest that women's employment rates went up slightly, primarily because many women started working as unpaid family workers. 8 The aggregate figures masks reallocation of employment across sectors, including a reversal of rural-urban migration patterns and an increase in informality. Both the industrial distribution of jobs shifted and patterns of job creation altered substantially: while manufacturing, construction and retail sectors had been growing rapidly in the lead-up to the crisis, that trend was reversed once it had begun. Appendix B presents supporting evidence on the evolution of employment and wages in the broader manufacturing sector based on repeated representative cross-sectional labor force surveys, the SAKERNAS data. This analysis corroborates our results.
Some limitations in the data should be kept in mind. First, only net changes in employment at the firm-level are observed. This could understate the total amount of churning that takes place.
Second, changes on the intensive margin cannot be identified. However, SAKERNAS estimates suggest that in manufacturing gender differences in adjustment in hours worked were small. Third, establishment-level wage data is available by occupation, but not by gender. We thus focus on the 9 The census treats establishments (plants) rather than firms as their units of interest. Less than 5% of establishments in the census are owned by multi-plant firms (see Blalock and Gertler 2004 for a thorough discussion). 10 Information on the capital stock was not recorded in 1996 and missing for some firms in other years. Concerns about possible selection biases have led us not to control for capital per worker in our regressions. The qualitative pattern of results, however, is robust to doing so, regardless of whether we impute the capital stock for all observations for which it is missing or whether we only use observations for which information on the capital stock is available. These results are omitted to conserve space, but available from the authors upon request. 11 To examine the sensitivity of our results to the 20-person cut-off, we re-estimated the regressions presented in this paper using a 30, 50 and 100-people cutoff instead. firm-size and the share of women in the workforce; small firms tend to be majority-male firms, while large firms tend to be majority female-firms. In part because they tend to be larger, firms that employ a larger proportion of women are also more likely to export. Yet, the share of women in the workforce is negatively correlated with capital intensity, value-added per worker and wages, variables that are positively correlated with firm-size (see plots 1G-1J). Part of the explanation is that sector differences are not controlled for (see below). Firms that use proportionately more blue-collar workers also employ proportionately more women (see figure 1F ). The coexistence of these patterns points towards the importance of sorting by gender into different types of firms. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics by industry, ranking them on the basis of the share of women they employed. Industries which are highly labor-intensive pay relatively low wages and have a high export propensity, such as the tobacco and apparel industry, employ a lot of women. Capital intensive industries, such as transport and motor vehicles, basic machinery and equipment employ relatively few women. Possible explanations for these sorting patterns are that women have a comparative advantage in industries that require fine motor skills and that they may lack more favorable outside opportunities (relative to men).
Given the sorting of women into larger firms, it is important to compare unweighted and weighted results (see Table 2 ). Unweighted statistics reflect average outcomes for firms, while weighted statistics reflect outcomes for workers, better capturing average outcomes for women.
While women represent 46 percent of blue-collar workers in manufacturing, only about a third of all white-collar workers are women. However, white-collar workers account for no more than 15% of all manufacturing workers. Whereas female share of blue-collar workers varies from 11.5 percent in motor vehicles to 70 percent in tobacco, there is much less variation in the share of women in white collar jobs across industries. 13 Ideally one would control for individual characteristics in testing for differential treatment effects. This information is not available, but we do include firm-level proxies for productivity and wages.
White-collar workers are typically better educated than blue-collar workers (see also Lipsey and Sjoholm, 2004 and Harrison and Scorse, 2009 ). Gender differences in education vary within occupation: Male blue-collar workers are on average slightly better educated than female ones, whereas female white-collar workers tend to be somewhat better educated than male white-collar workers.
A Bird's Eye View of Aggregate Adjustment Patterns
Employment Adjustment
Following Dunne et al. (1989) , figures 2A-D present descriptive statistics on job flows separately by occupation. Figure 2A shows that all measures of job flows become smaller in magnitude over time; both excess reallocation and net job creation diminished over time, consistent with declining labor market flexibility over time due to more stringent labor regulation. 14 The crisis is associated with a large drop in manufacturing employment opportunities, with the crisis leading to a spike in excess churning driven by a simultaneous increase in job destruction and a decrease in job creation. Nonetheless, the fact that, even during the crisis, job creation rates were as high as 13.8%
in 1997 and 16.3% in 1998 is indicative of high heterogeneity in firm performance. Figure 2B decomposes these changes for men and women. Contrary to the common perception that women are more vulnerable to shocks, the total number of manufacturing employment opportunities (i.e. the net job creation figures) for women fell by less than that of men during the crisis. While the difference in employment adjustment between men and women is small relative to total men and women employed, it is a substantial proportion of the total adjustment undertaken. With women representing 46% of the workers, they only suffered 34% of the net employment losses.
15 Figure 2C and Figure 2D present job flows by gender separately for blue collar workers and white collar workers. White-collar workers, the vast majority of whom are men, clearly suffered more savage employment losses. Women seem to have fared slightly better in both occupational categories. Thus the small gender differences in employment impact are in part attributable to men 14 After the fall of Suharto, policy priorities shifted, with greater labor protections put into place (see World Bank, 2010) , Hallward-Driemeier et al. 2010b. 15 These differences are also substantial in terms of the number of people affected; A one percentage adjustment in the number of jobs for men (women) amounts to roughly fifteen thousand jobs.
being more likely to be having white-collar jobs (sorting by occupation) and such jobs being more likely to be destroyed, and in part due to proportionately smaller reductions in the number of female jobs lost relative to men in both occupations.
Figures 3A-3D further distinguishes between job creation and destruction due to adjustment by incumbents, exit and entry of new firms. Gender differences are largely driven by job destruction by incumbents, which were most severe for men and account for the bulk of the decline in net job creation. Overall then, these findings suggest that while employment adjustment patterns for men and women look broadly similar, women fared better. 
Wage Adjustment
Figures 4A and 4B plot the evolution of firm-level average wage growth for blue-collar and white-collar workers. To assess how wage adjustment varied with the gender composition of the workforce, separate plots are drawn for firms where women comprise less than one third (male dominated), one to two thirds (gender neutral) and more than two thirds (female dominated) of the workers. For comparison, plot 5C depicts the evolution of inflation. Clearly, the spike in inflation that was precipitated by the devaluation of the Rupiah eroded real firm-average wages which declined by 22% for blue-collar workers in 1998 and by 28% for white-collar workers on average (see figures 4A and 4B). White-collar workers thus suffered both larger employment losses and larger wage cuts. After the crisis, real wage growth resumed. Consistent with the macroeconomic trends described in section 2, firms coped with the crisis primarily by adjusting real wages rather than slashing employment.
Plots 4A and 4B show that average firm wage adjustment was not very strongly correlated with the gender composition either for blue-collar or white-collar workers. The averages presented here mask significant heterogeneity within and between firms. The next three sections analyze this heterogeneity in more depth.
5 Selection through differences in Firm-Survival 16 In interpreting these findings it is important to bear in mind that we do not have any information whether or not separations were voluntary. For example, we cannot rule out the possibility that men who left manufacturing did so because they were able to take up more lucrative income earnings opportunities. However, this scenario seems somewhat in plausible in view of the fact that earnings declines were widespread and not confined to the initially affected sectors (Fallon and Lucas, 2002) .
The analysis of employment adjustment is divided into two components. First is the issue of job destruction from exiting firms; whether women were more or less likely to have sorted into firms that survived. Section 7 then assesses employment adjustment by surviving firms. Gender patterns could well differ between survival and growth, particularly if women are predominantly in larger firms that are more likely to survive, but then grow slower on average. Figure 5A tracks the evolution of entry and exit rates while Figure 5B plots how the gender composition of the workforce of exiting firms evolved over time. The crisis is clearly associated with a spike in exit rates. 17 Moreover, the average share of female workers in exiting firms dropped slightly during the crisis, consistent with the figures presented in section 5.
Econometric Framework
To model firm survival, a discrete-time proportional hazards survival model is used, which is estimated by means of logistic regression. 18 Following Cox (1972) we assume that the hazard rate, To examine how the determinants of firm-survival varied during the crisis, these explanatory variables are interacted with a dummy for the crisis period:
where Crisis is a dummy variable for 1997 and 1998. If (< 0), then the likelihood 17 There is another spike in exit in 2000, which is most probably driven, at least in part, by changes in survey design (see the Appendix for a discussion of this issue). 18 In discrete time, the survival function which measures the probability that for a firm i with a vector of characteristics, X, survival time, T, is at least , can be expressed as the product of the complements of period specific hazard rates: . The refer to the period specific hazard rates, which measure the conditional probability of exiting at time conditional on surviving until time and are defined as , where is the cumulative density function of time at risk given the vector of characteristics .
of exit increases (decreases) in absolute terms with the share of women employed during the crisisceteris paribus. The crisis interaction helps us assess whether firms employing more women were more likely to exit during the crisis relative to other periods. This testing strategy is very general as we allow all parameters of the hazard function to vary, thus minimizing parameter constancy restrictions. The proportional hazards specification is suitable to examine whether firms with certain characteristics were disproportionately more or less likely to exit during the crisis relative to other periods. Table 3 , column 1 confirms that female blue-collar workers were less likely to lose their jobs due to firm exit during the crisis. By contrast, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that exit was not correlated with the share of female white-collar workers during the crisis. The share of female whitecollar workers and its interaction with the crisis dummy are not jointly significant, even though the coefficient estimates suggest an inverse relationship between exit and the share of female whitecollar workers during non-crisis times.
Results
Part of the reason that women were less likely to lose their jobs due to exit was that they were employed in industries that were less vulnerable to the crisis (columns 2 and 3), 19 and in relatively large firms within industries (column 4), which were less likely to exit, and especially so during the crisis. 20 Once we include a full set of firm characteristics (column 5), including productivity, proxied by value-added per worker, 21 the share of women in the blue-collar workforce is no longer a significant predictor of firm exit during non-crisis times, but remains positively correlated with firm 19 Including industry dummies to control for differences in exit propensity due to sector selection (see column 2) results in the share of female blue-collar workers becoming more negatively correlated with exit. Thus, women are more likely to work as blue-collar workers in industries where firms have a higher exit propensity -ceteris paribus -and sorting by industry is an important determinant of gender differences. Including sector-year dummies (see column 3) reinforces these effects. 20 Controlling for size, as is done in column 4, causes the conditional association between the proportion of female blue-collar workers and exit to flip signs and become statistically significantly positive. By contrast, the coefficient for white-collar workers becomes much more negative and more significant. These conditional associations characterize both crisis and less turbulent times. Larger firms are significantly less likely to exit than small firms and especially so during the crisis. Part of the reason that women were less to lose their jobs than men because of firm exit was thus that they were working in larger firms. 21 Note that the sample for this estimation is smaller. Yet, these results are not driven by sample selection bias; results are omitted to conserve space, but available from the authors upon request. The results presented here are also robust to using measures of TFP (including those computed by means of the Solow and the Ackerberg-Caves-Frazer (2005) procedures) as a proxy for productivity instead. These results too are not presented to conserve space, but available from the authors upon request. Our preferred measure of productivity is value-added per worker since it is robust to the endogeneity concerns that plague Total Factor Productivity (TFP) estimation and because we do not require information on the capital stock to compute it.
exit during the crisis. 22 This is evidenced by the joint significance of the gender composition of the blue-collar workforce and its interaction with the crisis dummy, even though the latter interaction is not individually significant. The share of female white-collar workers remains significantly negatively correlated with exit. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the conditional correlation between the share of women in the workforce and firm survival observed during the crisis was not different from the one observed during non-crisis periods.
Overall, these findings highlight the importance of sorting; gender differences in employment losses due to firm exit are predominantly driven by sorting into firms that differed in their vulnerability to the crisis. Nonetheless, the gender composition of the workforce continues to have some explanatory power in predicting survival even after conditioning on other relevant firm characteristics; sorting explains much but not all of the gender patterns.
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Selection through differences in Firm-Growth
Figures 6A and 6B plot bivariate, locally-weighted polynomial regressions of the change in the log of the number of blue-and white-collar workers, respectively, on the gender composition of the workforce in the prior period, both during the crisis and during non-crisis years. Firms on average shed labor during the crisis, as the crisis lines lie substantially below the non-crisis lines in both plots. That white-collar workers were hit much harder by the crisis than blue-collar workers is evident when one notes the different scaling of the axes of the two figures.
Employment growth of blue-collar workers ( Figure 6A ) is very mildly negatively correlated with the share of women in the workforce during non-crisis years and not correlated with the gender composition during crisis years. Figure 6B provides evidence that the relationship between the proportion of female white-collar workers and the change in the total number of white-collar workers is not linear. Nevertheless, firms with a higher share of female white-collar workers generally grow slightly faster.
Econometric Strategy
To examine whether or not workers in firms that employ more women are more likely to be laid off, the change in total employment of workers of type j (blue-or white-collar) is regressed on the share of type j workers who are women at the start of the period, an interaction term between the share of women and the crisis period, , and both changes in as well as lagged levels of additional explanatory variables, . Our most general labor demand growth specification thus has an autoregressive distributed lag structure:
While our aim is to provide descriptive evidence, the latter labor demand model can also be rigorously derived from an underlying optimization framework (see the exposition in Nickell, 1987; Basu, Estrin and Svejnar, 2005; or Van Reenen and Bond, 2007) and given a structural interpretation.
If firms that employ proportionately more women grow faster (slower) than those that do not, then (< 0). The coefficient on the interaction tells us whether employment losses for these firms were larger in the crisis relative to other periods. The -absolute‖ adjustment during the crisis is given by + .
A number of econometric issues have to be addressed. First, to minimize the role of outliers we use the Haltiwanger growth measure, i.e. the change in employment over the average firm-size
, thus bounding the growth rate between -2 and +2.
Second, serial correlation in the error term in conjunction with the presence of lagged size as a regressor will cause OLS estimates of equation 3 to be biased. Fixed-effects estimates, too, will be biased as a result of the well-known Nickell bias, but in the opposite direction. Comparison of OLS and FE estimates will thus provide us with a confidence interval within which we expect the true parameter estimates to lie. 
Results
Tables 4A and 4B present regressions of growth in the number of blue-and white-collar workers. We first focus on blue-collar workers as they account for the bulk of manufacturing employment. The basic specifications presented in columns 1-5 demonstrate that the association between the gender composition of the workforce and labor growth is significant, but weak: moving from having no women to exclusively employing women would reduce the estimated average growth rate by only 0.7% (columns 1 and 2). The crisis did not lead to a statistically significant change in this association. This result is robust to controlling for fixed effects (column 3). Once regressions are weighted, however, employment growth of blue-collar workers is no longer correlated with the gender composition of the blue-collar workforce in the OLS specification (column 4), but remains negatively correlated with labor growth in the Fixed Effects specification (column 5). The reason for the negative correlation between the proportion of women and firm growth observed is thus that women are more likely to work in larger firms, which tend to grow less quickly than small firms conditional on survival. The interaction between the gender composition of the workforce and the crisis dummy is never statistically significant; that is, there was no special crisis effect.
The results of the more elaborate specifications presented in columns 6 through 9 accord with intuition: firms which paid higher wages last period and firms that increased wages, grow less quickly. This is consistent with the existence of a trade-off between wage and employment growth.
Interestingly, during the crisis these associations are even stronger, hinting at the possibility of a stronger trade-off between wage and employment adjustment. Of course, one has to bear in mind that wages are potentially endogenous. 25 In addition, exporters were much less likely to shed bluecollar workers during the crisis, presumably because they benefited from favorable exchange rate movements. Larger firms were also less likely to grow, though this finding is partly driven by survivor bias. Overall, the qualitative pattern of results is not very sensitive to weighting these regressions by firm-size.
moment conditions it invokes rely crucially on a mean stationarity assumption, which is a particularly unappealing assumption in the context of a crisis (see Roodman, 2006 for a discussion). We therefore eschew this approach. 25 Since the firm level average wage is a composite of men's and women's wages, these specifications also go a long way towards controlling for potential differences in employment growth due to possible gender differences in willingness to absorb real wage reductions, as these should be reflected in firm-level average wage changes.
Turning to the results of primary interest, conditioning on these other characteristics causes the sign on the gender composition to flip; growth in the number of blue-collar workers is now positively correlated with the proportion of women in the workforce. The interaction terms between the gender composition the crisis dummy are not significant in the OLS specification, but are positive and significant when controlling for fixed effects. As explained in the previous section, the -true‖ coefficient should lie in the interval between them. In any case, the magnitude of the gendercrisis interaction effect is small. Table 5B presents results for white-collar workers. The most striking finding is that employment growth of white-collar workers is always positively correlated with the share of female white-collar workers, but the crisis interaction term is never significant at the 5% level, though it is negative and significant at the 10% level in the Fixed Effects specifications that include a full set of controls.
In summary, the gender composition of the workforce is correlated with growth in employment. For blue-collar workers the proportion of women in the workforce becomes less negative (and even turns positive) as we include progressively more explanatory variables, attesting to the importance of sorting. Our results are furthermore consistent with the existence of a tradeoff between wage and employment adjustment.
Differential Treatment
Figures 7A and 7B plot the change in the share of women against total labor growth of the relevant category of workers for both blue-and white-collar workers, separately for both the crisis and noncrisis periods. The mild positive association between an increase in the proportion of female bluecollar workers in the firm and growth in the number of blue-collar workers suggests that as firms expand their blue-collar workforce they hire proportionately more women. However, proportionately more women are laid off when they contract. In other words, women's employment appears more pro-cyclical than men's employment. The figures do not suggest that this relationship was distinctly different during the crisis.
For white-collar workers, these relationships are slightly different. Figure 7B portrays a very small negative correlation between changes in the number of white-collar workers and the proportion of white-collar workers who are women during non-crisis times. Again, the crisis association does not seem markedly different from the association observed in less volatile times.
While the plots are striking as the observed unconditional correlations are small, the magnitude of the overall effects of differential treatment could be larger given the increased changes in employment during the crisis.
Econometric Approach
To assess the existence of differential treatment in more depth, the change in the proportion of women in the workforce is regressed on the total amount of labor adjustment and a set of explanatory variables. The most general specification distinguishes between positive and negative changes in total employment and interacts all explanatory variables with a crisis dummy:
+
Where the + and -indicate positive and negative employment changes respectively, thus enabling us to test for potential asymmetries between net hiring and firing, and, is a random error term. The explanatory variables allow us to control for, and characterize, firm heterogeneity.
Results
The results for blue-collar workers are presented in Table 5A . All specifications control for changes in the number of blue-collar workers (measured in logs), entered separately as either expansion (or no growth) and contraction, and their interactions with a crisis dummy. Overall, the regressions demonstrate that growth in the number of blue-collar workers is correlated with a small increase in the share of women, while a contraction is associated with a symmetric reduction in the proportion of women. Increasing (reducing) the number of blue-collar workers by 10% is associated with a 0.2-0.3% increase (decrease) in the share of blue-collar workers that are women.
This finding is consistent with the positive association between firm-size and the share of blue-collar workers that are women documented in Section 4. The crisis did not induce a change in these relationships relative to other periods. However, since average employment growth was negative during the crisis, it is likely that female blue-collar workers suffered comparatively larger employment losses as a result of differential treatment than male blue-collar workers did. These results are robust to controlling for industry-year dummies, establishment fixed effects and including additional controls including lagged size and the lagged gender composition of the firm. That the associations between changes in size and changes in the gender composition lose significance when these regressions are weighted, suggests that changes in the gender composition of the workforce associated with changes in firm-size are largest in small firms.
The results for white-collar workers are reported in Table 5B . The results reveal a small negative association between growth in the number of white-collar workers and the share of female white-collar workers. This is consistent with Figure 1A ; except for the very largest firms, the association between size and the share of female white-collar workers trends downwards. When firms expand the number of white-collar workers, they are likely to hire proportionately more men (relative to the prevailing gender composition of the white-collar workforce). Yet, when they reduce the number of white-collar workers, women are more likely to preserve their jobs. This pattern was not discernibly different during the crisis and is robust to controlling for the full set of controls.
Again, the results lose significance once we weight.
In summary, there is some evidence for differential treatment, operating predominantly in small firms. The crisis did not induce a change in these patterns and since average employment growth was lower during the crisis, the aggregate impact of differential treatment is likely to have been larger. Intriguingly, the impact of differential treatment varied by occupation. Firms that contracted their blue-collar workforce fired proportionately more women, while firms that reduced their white-collar workforce fired proportionately more men. One possible explanation for these findings is that firms were more likely to retain their most skilled employees, which, in the case of blue-collar workers were men, and in the case of white-collar workers were women.
What Happened to Relative Wages? The Evolution of the Gender Pay Differences
Econometric Approach
The comparatively favorable employment consequences of the crisis for women might be due to a change in the relative price of female labor versus male labor. We regress the logarithm of these firm-level average wages, , on the share of women, , and a vector of firm characteristics, , interacted with a crisis dummy. That is, we estimate regressions of the form: where is a time invariant and unobserved firm-specific fixed effect and is an error term that is assumed to have zero mean and finite variance. A correlation between and any of the regressors can cause OLS estimates to be biased. Our preferred estimator is therefore the Fixed Effects estimator; wage adjustment is identified on the basis of within-firm changes, and any potential bias due to unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics is removed. The coefficient on the share of women, measures the differences in pay between men and women, conditional on observable firm characteristics as captured in and can be considered a crude proxy for the gender pay gap (see Hellerstein and Neumark, 1999) . 
Results
Results for blue-collar workers are presented in Tables 6A and 6B . Again we progressively add explanatory variables to examine to what extent pay differences are associated with gender, per se, and to what extent they are accounted for by other factors. The share of women is strongly negatively correlated with firm-level average wages, which is indicative of gender-pay differences.
Controlling for firm-fixed effects reduces gender pay differences dramatically. This demonstrates that men sort into higher paying firms. Nonetheless, the fact that the gender premium is robust to controlling for time-invariant characteristics suggest that gender pay differences are not exclusively driven by sorting. Table 6A also underscores the importance of weighting, which reduces the gender wage gap.
Moreover, in unweighted regressions, the crisis interaction term is mildly positive and significant.
Once we employment weight these regressions (columns 3 and 4), however, the crisis has a negative impact on gender pay differences for blue-collar workers, exacerbating them by roughly 4% on average. The latter effect is statistically significant at the 10% level in our preferred FE specification.
Thus, on average, women experienced larger wage losses than men. The reason is that in larger firms, which tend to employ proportionately more women, the mitigation impact of the crisis on the gender pay differences appears inverted (more on this below). While the magnitude of the gender differential in crisis impact may seem substantial, the differential arose in the context of wage losses in the 30 percent range.
27 It has to be interpreted with caution since we cannot identify changes in the earnings distribution within firms and lack controls for time-varying and time-invariant characteristics of the workforce such as education and hours worked. suggesting that endogeneity bias is not very large. In the unweighted regressions, the interaction of the share of women with the crisis dummy becomes even more positive than it had been before.
After weighting, the crisis gender interaction is now insignificant. Comparing these specifications with the more basic weighted specifications presented in Table 6A reveals that the crisis-interaction terms loses explanatory power once other firm characteristics are controlled for; that is, gender differences in wage adjustment appear to be driven by sorting.
These results are unlikely to be driven by selection bias: 30 columns 5 and 6 estimate the model using full controls but exclude firms that did not survive until 2004. This sample should suffer from maximum omitted variable bias. Nevertheless, the estimated gender premia do not change very much and are not statistically significantly different from those obtained on the full sample.
To examine how the impact of the crisis on gender pay differences varies with firm size, columns 7 through 10 add as additional explanatory variables the interaction of firm size and the share of blue-collar workers who are women and a triple interaction between the crisis, size and the share of workers who are women. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that during the crisis the reduction in the gender pay differences was much smaller in larger firms.
31
Results for white-collar workers are presented in table 6A and 6C and are qualitatively similar to the results obtained for blue-collar workers, albeit that gender pay differences are much smaller.
28 These results are robust to controlling for capital per worker and controlling for productivity using measures of TFP rather than value-added per worker. Using these controls leads to a substantial reduction in sample size since information on capital is missing for a large number of firms and missing altogether in 1996 -which is why we prefer specifications that exclude capital and use value-added per worker as our proxy for productivity. Nonetheless, results are available from the authors upon request, but omitted to conserve space. 29 Size is positively correlated with average firm-level wages in the OLS specifications while the impact of size in the fixed effects regressions is negative, perhaps because of measurement error (recall that the average wage variables is computed by dividing the total wage bill by the total number of employees). 30 Given the difficulty of finding an instrument that would pass the exclusion restriction, we instead follow the approach suggested by Dunne et al. (1989) and try to gauge the magnitude of survivor bias by comparing the results obtained by estimating our models on the entire sample with those obtained by estimating the models on a sample of firms that remained in the data until 2004 only. Comparison of the two sets of results is informative about the size of survivor bias, as estimates obtained for the latter sample suffer from maximum survivor bias. 31 In regressions not presented here to conserve space, we have also examined with triple interactions of the crisis, the gender composition of the workforce and other explanatory variables such as being an exporter and minimum wage levels. However, the heterogeneity in the gender impacts of wage adjustment associated with size is robust to including these additional interactions. Results are available from the authors upon request.
Moreover, once we employment-weight these regressions, the crisis has no significant impact on gender pay differences for white-collar workers. Again, there is heterogeneity in wage adjustment associated with firm size; in the smallest firms, gender differences in pay appear reduced, while in large firms they seem exacerbated during the crisis.
In summary, it seems that female blue collar workers suffered somewhat more severe losses because they were working in firms that cut wages more. For female white-collar workers, no such effect is observed. We also find evidence suggestive of heterogeneity in adjustment patterns associated with size; gender pay differences appear to have grown more in larger firms for both white and blue-collar workers.
Conclusion
This paper has examined whether and to what extent firm responses to the East Asian crisis affected men and women's manufacturing employment and wages differently. Most of the adjustment took place via a drastic reduction in real wages, facilitated by high inflation, but employment adjustment was important too. Gender differences in the impact of the crisis on manufacturing employment and wages were small in absolute terms but substantial relative to the total amount of adjustment undertaken. Women's employment was less affected than men's employment, though women on average suffered slightly larger wage cuts.
The comparatively favorable employment and comparatively adverse wage consequences for women were predominantly due to sorting by gender into firms that were less vulnerable to the crisis. Most saliently, women's employment was concentrated in larger firms and firms that offered relatively fewer white-collar jobs. Such firms exhibited lower net employment losses. Although they were less likely to grow conditional on survival, larger firms were more likely to survive, such that, in net terms, larger firms shed less labor. Part of the sorting by gender also occurred along occupational lines. 3233 Thus, men also suffered more because they were more likely to be working in white-collar jobs, which were more vulnerable. On the other hand, female blue-collar workers 32 However, white-collar workers comprise only a small share of all manufacturing employment, such that aggregate gender differences in crisis impact associated with sorting into different occupations are small. 33 We also examined whether or not the fact that white-collar workers were hit harder by the crisis was due to withinfirm adjustment in the occupational structure of the workforce (for example, one might speculate that firms have a proclivity to fire disproportionately more white-collar workers when they are confronted with a shock) but did not find any evidence that this was the case. Results are omitted to conserve space but available from the authors upon request.
appear to have experienced slightly larger wage losses because they were employed in firms that reduced wages more.
Differential treatment effects varied by occupation as well as firm size, and are obscured in aggregate statistics. When firms expanded, the share of blue-collar workers that were female increased somewhat, while the share of white-collar workers that were female decreased. These relationships were not statistically different during the crisis yet had a larger impact on gender differences in aggregate labor market outcomes since there was more employment adjustment than before or after the crisis. These differential treatment effects are muted and insignificant in weighted regressions, indicating they predominantly operated in small firms. By contrast, differential treatment effects in wage adjustment appear most pronounced in large firms, where gender pay differences grew. These findings are suggestive of discrimination of women in such firms. Nonetheless, even with evidence of differential treatment, the claims about crises inducing a vast surge in employer discrimination discussed in the introduction appear exaggerated; if discrimination was really driving women's vulnerability, one would have expected to see much more dramatic results.
This paper has documented heterogeneity in the relative importance of these channels across different types of firms and workers in different occupations. It has, moreover, demonstrated how aggregate statistics may mask countervailing transmission channels. Furthermore, it has highlighted the possibility that not only wage-employment tradeoffs can be gender-specific, but also that genderspecificity in these tradeoffs is potentially heterogeneous across firms. Examining to what extent this is the case using matched employer-employee data, and assessing to what extent our findings generalize to other sectors and other crises, are promising areas for further research. Overall, this paper underscores the importance of analyzing and documenting heterogeneity in firms' adjustment to major macroeconomic shocks in understanding the distributional impacts of crises. 20% 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 The sample is restricted to firms for which the absolute change in employment was lower than 50%. OLS Weighted regressions use as weight the average number of blue-collar workers over the period over which the growth is defined, FE Weighted regressions use as weights the average number of blue-collar workers over the entire period The sample is restricted to firms for which the absolute change in employment was lower than 50%. OLS Weighted regressions use as weight the average number of white-collar workers over the period over which the growth is defined, FE Weighted regressions use as weights the average number of white-collar workers over the entire period Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered by establishment. OLS Weighted regressions use as weight the average number of blue-/white-collar workers over the period over which the growth is defined, FE Weighted regressions use as weights the average number of blue-/white-collar workers over the entire period as weight the average number of white-collar workers over the period over which the growth is defined, FE Weighted regressions use as weights the average number of white-collar workers over the entire period Appendix A: Examining the representativeness of our findings using SAKERNAS This appendix contains an analysis of gender differences in the impact of the East Asian crisis on manufacturing wages and employment using SAKERNAS -a nationally representative labor force survey. This analysis complements the firm-level analysis presented in the main body of the text and helps assess the representativeness of the results obtained.
The SAKERNAS data contain detailed information on individual's gender, age, education, occupation and earnings. Yet, we cannot match individual workers to firms in the census. Moreover, while SAKERNAS enables us to identify which individuals are employed in manufacturing, information on firm-size is lacking. Thus the sample of manufacturing workers in SAKERNAS contains not only employees of firms observed in the SI data (that is, firms with more than 20 employees), but also many individuals who work in very small manufacturing firms, allowing a comparison of the entire manufacturing sector with the larger, more formal firms covered by the manufacturing census. Figure A1 depicts the evolution of aggregate employment and manufacturing employment, separately for men and women. The crises only induced a small change in overall employment (consistent with the patterns discussed in sections 2 and 5) and the differences between men and women were not large. Post-crisis, aggregate employment rates dropped, but by slightly more for women than for men. The evolution of manufacturing employment is more volatile and it appears as though the crisis induced a substantial reduction in manufacturing employment, and that this reduction was slightly larger for men than for women. Post-crisis, manufacturing employment rebounded, and men's manufacturing employment grew more quickly than women's. Note that these trends are not strictly comparable to those observed using the SI-data, which do not demonstrate an increase in the number of manufacturing jobs. Part of the reason might have to do with the fact that the SI data only covers large manufacturing firms; it may be the case that the number of small manufacturing firms has risen rapidly (perhaps partly reflecting an increase in informality in response to decreasing labor market flexibility due to more stringent labor laws). Figure A2 depicts the evolution of average wages and average manufacturing wages for men and women separately using SAKERNAS data. These trends are consistent with those observed using the SI-data as both men's and women's real wages fell precipitously during the crisis in manufacturing and in other sectors. However, in contrast with the findings obtained using the SI data, men's average real manufacturing earnings appear to have fallen more than women's.
A.1 Employment adjustment
A.2 Wage Adjustment
To assess whether the gender wage gap indeed closed, we estimate standard Mincerian equations that mimic the firm-level specifications presented in section 9. That is we estimate equations of the form:
Where is a dummy variable indicating the gender of the individual and is a vector of individual-specific characteristics, include their age and education, and is an error term. provides a measure of the gender wage gap, while tells us by how much the gender wage gap changed during the crisis. These equations are estimated separately for blue-collar and whitecollar workers.
The results are presented in Table A1 . The dependent variable is real monthly earnings. Column 1 only includes a gender dummy and its interaction with the crisis dummy and a control for the number of hours worked, as well as province year dummies. Column 2 adds age, age squared and dummies for educational attainment. Column 3 interacts these with crisis dummies. Columns 4, 5 and 6 repeat specifications 1, 2 and 3 respectively, for white-collar workers.
The raw gender premium in manufacturing is roughly 28% for blue-collar workers and 30% for white-collar workers. Controlling for age and education reduces these premia to 19% and 21% respectively. Note that these premia are similar to the ones obtained using the firm-level average wages (see Section 9). The crisis-gender interaction dummy is negative but never statistically significant for blue-collar workers, suggesting that women suffered more adverse wage losses even though we cannot reject the null that the gender wage gap did not shrink during the crisis (note that that the estimates imply that women's wages dropped by 4.9% more than men's wages; this number is strikingly similar to the estimates of the widening of gender pay gaps by 4% obtained with the firm-level data). For white-collar workers it is positive and significant if education and age are not controlled for. Once individual characteristics are controlled for, the interaction of gender with the crisis dummy becomes insignificant. The null hypothesis that the gender-wage gaps for both bluecollar and white-collar workers did not change during the crisis cannot be rejected.
These results are consistent with those obtained using the SI data. While the gender wage gap in the SI increased on average, the increase in the wage gap was positively correlated with firm size. Women in the smallest SI firms experienced a reduction in the gender wage gap. Consequently, it should perhaps not come as a surprise that once we include employees of firms with fewer than 20 employees in our sample, the average wage gap is reduced.
Overall, then, the results obtained using the SAKERNAS dataset are broadly consistent with those obtained using the SI data. Survei Industri (SI) from Indonesia's statistical bureau (Badan Pusat Statistik-BPS) provides the plant-level data used in this paper. The SI is an annual census of all manufacturing establishments with more than 20 employees. 34 While the annual survey has been conducted going back to 1975, field procedures for identifying new firms were dramatically improved over [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] , making the accuracy of measuring entry prior to 1990 problematic (see Aswicahyono, 2008) . Moreover, the dataset does not consistently differentiate male versus female blue-collar or white-collar workers prior to 1993, so as a result, this paper only considers the data post 1993. We use data up until 2004, since data from later years are not immediately comparable due to changes in firm identifiers, changing definitions of key explanatory variables, and province splits.
B.2 Construction of Key Explanatory Variables
Sector
Sector of main product In order to classify establishments by industry, BPS records the five-digit International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) for firms based on the product with the largest production value in any given year. In 2001, BPS changed the classification of plants from the second revision of the ISIC to the third. A consistent bridge between these different coding systems was constructed based upon the inclusion of both codings in the dataset for the 2000 survey database. This bridge was corroborated using a bridge provided by BPS. In many cases, the industry code provided in the dataset was truncated to four or fewer digits. Where possible, if an adjacent year's reported industry for the same firm was available that was used to fill in the truncated digits. Where plants produce multiple products or the production processes allow changing from one product to another, we may expect to see the coded industry of production change from year to year. In such cases, the mode sector code is used (with ties going to the initial sector code reported).
Labor
Total labor for an establishment was defined as the sum of all paid and non-paid workers, whether production or non-production workers. 35 Production workers were defined by BPS as all workers who work directly in the production process or activities connected with production process, and non-production workers were defined to be all other workers. These definitions roughly correspond to traditional definitions of blue-and white-collar workers, respectively (see below).
Blue collar workers the sum of all production and unpaid workers. After 2000, we are unable to distinguish paid from unpaid workers in production and non-production occupations, and prior to 2001, we are unable to distinguish whether unpaid workers are in production or non-production. As a result, we do not include them in the labor variables prior to 2001, but there is a slight jump in employment as a result of this discrepancy in this year. 34 By law, all firms with over 20 employees are required to complete the BPS's questionnaire every year. Every ten years (1986, 1996, 2006) BPS devotes additional resources to track down all firms to ensure that any firms that had not been reporting do so. A major tracking effort was thus undertaken immediately prior to the crisis, and we can thus be reasonably confident that the data are not missing out on a substantial group of non-reporting firms. 35 Although BPS does not explicitly define it, this is understood to include both permanent and temporary workers. White collar workers: the sum of all non-production workers.
Unskilled ratio. The unskilled ratio was constructed as the share of blue collar workers (including unpaid production workers) as a share of the total establishment employment.
Share of female workers. The share of female workers (whether blue or white-collar workers) is constructed, quite simply, by dividing the number of female blue-(white-)collar workers by the total number of blue-(white-)collar workers.
The establishment-level total wage bill was constructed as the sum of cash wages/salary and in-kind benefits for blue and white-collar workers deflated to 1993 rupiah using the national consumer price index obtained from the World Development Indicators.
Wages. Wages are defined as the average wage for blue-or white collar workers, constructed as the total wage bill for either group divided by the number of workers of either respective group. Real wages are constructed by deflating the nominal wage bill reported to BPS by provincial CPI obtained from BPS.
Minimum wages. Minimum wages were obtained from BPS as monthly provincial minimum wages set by each province (or averages where there is within-province variation across districts) for each year. These reflect the nominal rupiah amount that all formal sector workers are required to be paid at or above. To obtain minimum wages in real terms, we deflated provincial minimum wages by the corresponding provincial CPI obtained from BPS.
Capital and materials
Capital was defined using the provided estimated value of machinery and equipment for each establishment in a given year. Where the estimated value was not available, the book value was used as provided. These values were deflated to 1993 rupiah values on an annual basis using the reported GDP deflator for machinery for 1993-2001 provided by BPS and using the manufacturing sector deflator for 1990-1992. The manufacturing survey does not include data on the value of the capital stock for 1996, so these values were interpolated using predicted values constructed from a regression of the capital stock on contemporaneous output, material inputs, labour usage, ownership characteristics, whether or not the firm exports, province and lagged capital for 1991-1995. In a separate imputation procedure, we also imputed capital for firms that did not report their capital stocks.
Materials were defined using the total reported value of raw materials used by the firm. These were deflated to 1993 rupiah using a deflator constructed from 2-digit industry GDP deflators weighted by the shares of input indicated from input-output tables obtained from the OECD Input-Output Table Database for 1995  and 2000 .
Value-added and gross output
Value-added and gross output were calculated by BPS on the basis of the total value of production (and net of total expenditure for value added). Both variables were deflated to 1993 rupiah using a 2-digit industry level GDP deflator.
Firm age
Firm age was constructed using the difference between the survey year and the year the firm reported the start of production.
Export Status and ownership
Exporters were identified for 1993-2000 based upon reporting that the share of output exported was nonzero and non-missing, and for 2001-2004 based upon a variable identifying whether any output was exported (both variables are not available in the data for all years.) Foreign owned firms based upon whether foreign ownership was reported to be non-missing and non-zero.
Government owned firms were defined the same way based on both local and national government.
Entry and exit
Entry is defined as the first year an establishment is observed in the data. Firms may have been in operation for several years prior to crossing the minimum threshold of 20 employees to be included in the survey. Firm exit is defined as permanent exit from the dataset. Note that, since the survey only includes firms with 20 or more employees, firms whose employment falls below this threshold will be defined as having exited in case they do not reappear in the data. There is a spike in exit rates in 2000 that is due partially to economic factors (a recession) and data issues that are likely to have been caused by the -big bang‖ decentralization of central government in Indonesia at that time and the splitting off of new provinces that occurred as a result. Because the statistics ministry manages its enumerators out of province offices, some anecdotal evidence points to the fact that tracking firms became more difficult and may have resulted in spurious exit (see Hallward-Driemeier and Rijkers, 2010a for a more detailed description).
B. 3 Cleaning of outliers
The problem of non-persistent extreme values is recognized in published work using the SI (see for example, Blalock, Gertler and Levine, 2008) . In some cases, these values may be the result of key punch errors, where, for example, ownership share is recorded as 340 percent rather than 34 percent. Where shares (exports and ownership) were reported, these were easily corrected, but for balance sheet variables, more extensive cleaning was required.
These likely key punch errors and other highly volatile trends were corrected in the data by identifying firms with implausibly large non-persistent changes over one or two years and replacing values with those of preceding and succeeding years (or just one or the other of the observation was at beginning or end of the series). Based on close observation of normal variation of these variables, the thresholds for identifying large non-persistent shifts where other variables did not shift as dramatically were a 100% change in labor, a 200% in real value added and real output, a 150% change in real inputs, and 100% change in capital and average wages. Next, firms were dropped from the data when they had such a significant number of non-persistent jumps that it was impossible to interpolate (this constituted less than 1% of the sample). Finally remaining outliers were identified by eyeballing plots of key relationships (e.g. inputs per worker) and spot interpolating obvious remaining outliers.
